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NTSB REPORTS-THE WAR OVER ADMISSIBILITY-A
strict reading of 49 U.S.C. app. § 1441(e) prohibits admis-
sion of NTSB accident reports in multidistrict litigation
arising out of a civilian air crash. In re Air Crash Disaster at
Sioux City, Iowa, on July 19, 1989, 780 F. Supp. 1207 (N.D.
Ill. 1991).
On July 19, 1989, a United Airlines DC-10 pilot lost all
ability to manipulate flight controls when an engine ex-
plosion severed hydraulic fuel lines. Flight 232, enroute
from Denver to Chicago, attempted a crash landing at
Sioux City, Iowa. Of the 296 passengers and crew on
board, 112 died in the crash.
The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) is
charged with the responsibility of investigating aviation
accidents to determine the circumstances, conditions, and
ultimately the probable cause of the accident.' Pursuant
to these duties, the NTSB began an immediate investiga-
tion of the Sioux City crash and published its findings on
November 1, 1990, in a final Aircraft Accident Report.2
1 49 U.S.C. app. § 1441(a) (1988). The controlling statute states that the NTSB
shall:
(1) Make rules and regulations governing notification and report of
accidents involving civil aircraft;
(2) Investigate such accidents and report the facts, conditions, and
circumstances relating to each accident and the probable cause
thereof;
(3) Make such recommendations to the Secretary of Transportation
as, in its opinion, will tend to prevent similar accidents in the future;
(4) Make such reports public in such form and manner as may be
deemed by it to be in the public interest; and
(5) Ascertain what will best tend to reduce or eliminate the possibil-
ity of, or recurrence of, accidents by conducting special studies and
investigations on matters pertaining to safety in air navigation and
the prevention of accidents.
Id.
2 In re Air Crash Disaster at Sioux City, Iowa, on July 19, 1989, 780 F. Supp.
1207, 1208 (N.D. Ill. 1991).
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The report compiled and analyzed the factual information
about the crash and contained numerous factual conclu-
sions of alternative probable causes of the crash.3
In a consolidated multidistrict action filed in the North-
ern District of Illinois, plaintiffs intended to offer the
NTSB report as evidence in support of personal injury,
survival, and punitive damages claims. Defendants,
United Airlines, Inc., UAL Corporation, and General
Electric Company, moved in limine to exclude all or part
of the report, citing 49 U.S.C. app. § 1441(e) and 49
U.S.C. app. § 1903(c) as statutory bars to the evidence. 4
The court's ruling is the subject of analysis of this
casenote.
In examining whether NTSB reports may be used as ev-
idence in trial, Part I of this casenote will recount the his-
tory of the NTSB and related statutory authority
concerning NTSB reports. Part II will examine early case
law concerning the admissibility of NTSB investigator tes-
timony and NTSB reports, and Part III will address recent
cases leading to the Sioux City decision. Part IV will ex-
plore the Sioux City court's reasoning in light of preceding
case law. Part V will conclude with the current status of
the war over admissibility.
I. HISTORY OF THE NTSB
Congress first regulated aviation with the Air Com-
merce Act of 1926. This Act provided that the Secretary
of Air Commerce, under the Department of Commerce
should "investigate, record and make public the cause of
accidents in civil air navigation. ' 6
By 1937, the number of deaths in aviation accidents had
risen over fifty-six percent from the time of the Air Coin-
3 Id.
4 49 U.S.C. app. §§ 1441(e), 1903(c) (1988). Sections 1441(e) and 1903(c) con-
tain identical proscriptions. Id.
I Pub. L. No. 69-254, 44 Stat. 568 (1926) (repealed 1958).
6 Id. § 172(e), 44 Stat. at 569.
[58
merce Act.7 Public awareness of the dangers of air travel
were heightened by the deaths of Knute Rockne in 1931
and Will Rogers in 1935 and the Hindenbuerg crash of
1937.8 As a result, Congress amended the Air Commerce
Act in 1934, and again in 1937, to promote safety by
strengthening the investigation process.9 These amend-
ments mandated that the Secretary of Air Commerce hold
hearings and report the causes of aviation accidents and
prohibited the use of the Secretary's report in any action
arising from the accident.' 0 The Secretary then promul-
gated regulations for accident investigation procedures
and established a five-member investigation board con-
sisting of three Department of Commerce employees and
two outside advisors."
In 1938, Congress again took action to make aviation
safer by enacting the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, which
established and incorporated all aviation functions into
the Civil Aeronautics Authority.' 2 The Authority was
short-lived due to organizational problems that led to a
complete reorganization in 1940. t3 The reorganization
created two separate agencies, the Civil Aeronautics
Board (CAB) and the Civil Aeronautics Administration
(CAA), both under the control of the Department of
Commerce.' 4 This approach continued until 1958, when
Congress passed the Federal Aviation Act.' 5
C.O. Miller, Aviation Accident Investigation: Functional and Legal Perspectives, 46J.
AIR L. & CoM. 237, 238-39 (1981). Miller notes that in 1926 five persons were
killed in air carrier accidents and 146 persons were killed in general aviation acci-
dents. In 1937, 52 persons were killed in air carrier accidents and 184 in general
aviation accidents. Id.
8 Id. at 239.
9 Id. (citing Air Commerce Act of 1926, as amended by Pub. L. No. 73-418, 48
Stat. 1113 (1934)).
10 Id. (citing § 2(e) of the Air Commerce Act).
11 Miller, supra note 7, at 239 (citing Civil Air Regulations, 15 C.F.R. §§ 91.0-
.37 (1939)).
12 Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-706, 52 Stat. 973 (1938) (re-
pealed 1958).
11 See Miller, supra note 7, at 240-41.
14 Id. at 241.
5 Id. at 242-43 (citing 49 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1542 (1976)). This reorganization
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The 1958 Act delegated the accident investigation re-
sponsibility to the CAB, providing that the CAB should
determine the probable cause of accidents and make rec-
ommendations to the FAA that could prevent future acci-
dents.' 6 Section 701(e) of the 1958 Act also prohibited
the use of accident reports in litigation by providing that
"no part of any report or reports of the Board of Author-
ity relating to any accident, or the investigation thereof,
shall be admitted as evidence or used in any suit or action
for damages growing out of any matter mentioned in such
report or reports."' 17
With the passage of the Department of Transportation
Act of 1966, the NTSB was born.' 8 Accident investigation
under the NTSB continued much as it had under the CAB
until the Board became an independent agency in 1974.'9
Section 701(e) was succeeded by 49 U.S.C. app.
§ 1441(e), which continued the prohibition of using the
NTSB (Board) report as follows: "No part of any report
or reports of the [Board] relating to any accident or the
investigation thereof, shall be admitted as evidence or
used in any suit or action for damages growing out of any
matter mentioned in such report or reports. °20 Section
1441(e) purports to create an express privilege, which
would completely bar the use of Board reports; however,
not all courts interpreted the statute in that way.'
was brought on by the advent of the supersonic jet, which drew public attention to
safety matters. Id. at 243.
16 Federal Aviation Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-726, § 701, 72 Stat 31 (1958)
(codified as amended at 49 U.S.C. app. § 1441 (1988)).
17 Id. § 701(e) (current version codified at 49 U.S.C. app. § 1441(e) (1988)).
"8 Department of Transportation Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-670, § 5, 80 Stat.
931, 935 (1966) (repealed 1975).
19 See Miller, supra note 7, at 246. The NTSB became an independent agency as
part of the Independent Safety Board Act of 1974, §§ 301-09, 49 U.S.C. app.
§§ 1901-1907 (1988). For a discussion of the conflict of interest concerns leading
to this Act, see Miller, supra note 7, at 247-48.
20 49 U.S.C. app. § 144 1(e) (1988). See also Roy T. Atwood, Admissibility of Na-
tional Transportation Safety Board Reports in Civil Air Crash Litigation, 53 J. AIR L. &
CoM. 469, 470-74 (1987) (briefly discussing the statutory change).
21 See 8 CHARLES A. WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PRO-
CEDURE § 2019 (1970).
CASENOTE
II. EARLY CASE LAW ON NTSB REPORT
ADMISSIBILITY
A. UNIVERSAL AIRLINES V. EASTERN AIRLINES
The congressional mandate of section 701 (e), predeces-
sor of current § 1441(e), seemed clear until interpreted
by an early court decision. In Universal Airline v. Eastern
Airlines,22 the court dealt with the issue of whether section
701 (e) acted as an absolute bar to discovery, thereby pre-
cluding testimony of Board employees.
The Board interpreted section 701 (e) to mean that tes-
timony of its investigators could not be used as evidence
in a cause of action seeking damages. In Universal, the
Board filed an amicus curie brief setting forth five reasons
for this position: (1) Congress instructed the Board to in-
vestigate accidents solely to gain information in order to
prevent future accidents, not to provide evidence or wit-
nesses for litigation, (2) the disclosure of the information
would discourage frank disclosure by the investigators, (3)
a particular investigator's conclusions may differ from the
ultimate cause of determination by the Board, (4) the con-
clusions of the investigator would tend to influence jury
findings of civil liability, and (5) the time required for in-
vestigators to testify at trials would be burdensome to the
Board.
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
noted that although the Board's reasons for proscribing
the testimony as evidence were useful to further Board
goals, section 701(e) must be construed "with reference
to the governmental function of administering justice, the
judicial power, and the established practice and prece-
dents of our system of jurisprudence. '23 The court fur-
ther noted that the authority to compel witness
attendance was an essential part of the administration of
justice.24 Even the Board admitted in its brief that in
22 188 F.2d 993 (D.C. Cir. 1951).
22 Id. at 998.
24 Id.
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many cases their investigators were the only people
knowledgeable of certain facts and information following
aircraft accidents.2 6 The Board's regulations further pro-
vided rules for deposing investigators. For these reasons,
the court held it was not error to admit the investigator's
testimony.27
The Universal court did not address whether the investi-
gator could testify about personal opinions based upon
the investigation, since the testimony in question was fac-
tual. The court did note that the investigator would not
be allowed to testify about issues that directly or indirectly
reflected the ultimate findings of the Board.28 Such testi-
mony would be inadmissible and "tend to usurp the func-
tion of the jury" by allowing Board determinations of
probable cause to influence jury determinations of
cause.
29
Further, the Universal court determined that sound au-
thority prevented courts from compelling the Board to
produce its report, noting the statutory proscription of
section 701(e).3 0  The court added that Board reports
often contained statements of "hearsay based upon hear-
say," which are inadmissible.' While the Board's report
was deemed inadmissible, by allowing courts to compel
investigation testimony, the Universal court opened the
door for future interpretation of section 701 (e).
25 Id. at 1000.
26 Id. at 999.
27 Id. The court noted that "the trial court should ordinarily receive the deposi-
tion of the CAB investigator, rather than order his personal attendance." Id. The
Universal decision preceded the Board regulations stating that -[t]estimony of
Board employees may be made available for use in actions or suits for damages
arising out of accidents through depositions or written interrogatories. Board
employees are not permitted to appear and testify in court in such actions." 49
C.F.R. § 835.5(a) (1991).
28 Universal, 188 F.2d at 1000.
29 Id.
3o Id.; see also id. at 998 n.2 (quoting § 70 1(e)).
31 Id. at 1000. "Hearsay based upon hearsay" refers to the statements con-
tained in the Board's report taken from witnesses at the scene of the accident and
from recordings of the hearings held by the Board. See id.
[58
B. LOBEL V. AMERICAN AIRLINES
Less than one year after the Universal opinion, the Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit decided Lobel v. American
Airlines.3 2 Lobel involved an action for personal injuries
sustained in the crash of an American Airlines flight. At
trial, the court admitted into evidence a Board investiga-
tor's report despite the prohibition contained in section
701(e).3 3 The jury found for the plaintiff.3 4 American
Airlines appealed, claiming that the district court judge
clearly erred by admitting the report into evidence.35
The court of appeals held that the admission of the re-
port was not error, applying their interpretation of the ra-
tionale in Universal.3 6 The court determined that the
report contained only the investigator's personal observa-
tions without opinions or conclusions regarding probable
cause and did not include statements of "hearsay based
upon hearsay."'37 Furthermore, the content of the report
was within the scope of questions that could have been
asked at the investigator's deposition .3
The Lobel court apparently read the Universal decision to
prevent only the admission of evidence of the Board's
findings of probable cause. Since the report did not con-
tain such findings of probable cause and because it did
not violate the Universal evidentiary prohibition of con-
taining "hearsay based upon hearsay, ' 39 the court admit-
ted the report into evidence. 40 The Lobel court failed to
take into account that the Universal decision excluded the
report because it violated rules of evidence precluding
hearsay. Further, ignoring the evidentiary preclusion cir-
cumvented the interpretation of section 701(e) in
32 192 F.2d 217 (2d Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 945 (1952).
33 Id. at 220.
34 Id. at 219.





40 Lobel, 192 F.2d at 220.
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Universal.4'
In Lobel, the Second Circuit simply ignored the clear
language of section 701 (e) and allowed the report into ev-
idence by looking to the limited legislative history of the
section.42 The court interpreted section 701(e) in light of
this history to preclude evidence from reports only when
such evidence contained findings and opinions that would
invade upon the function of the jury.43
C. BERGUIDO V. EASTERN AIR LINES
The Third Circuit declined to apply the Lobel interpre-
tation of section 701(e) to the successor § 1441(e) 44 in
Berguido v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc. 4  Berguido concerned a
wrongful death action resulting from the crash of an East-
ern Air Lines plane. At trial, the district court judge al-
lowed deposition testimony of the Board's investigators
into evidence. The deposition testimony consisted of
mathematical computations based upon factual observa-
tions of the crash scene.
Appealing from the jury verdict, Eastern contended
that the district court erred in admitting the deposition
testimony under the Lobel court's rationale that § 1441(e)
allowed investigator deposition testimony only of per-
sonal observations of the scene of the crash and condition
of the plane. Eastern contended that since the computa-
tions were not performed by the investigator testifying,
they were not personal observations and therefore not ad-
missible. The Third Circuit held the admission of the tes-
4' See Walter A.T. Welch, Jr. & John E. Faulk, The Use of Aviation Accident Reports
by Civil Litigants: The Historical Development of 49 U.S.C. Section 1441(e), 9 PEPP. L.
REV. 583, 588 (1982).
42 Lobel, 192 F.2d at 220. The scant legislative history showed that Congress
intended § 701(3) to prevent the use of Board reports that showed the Board's
opinion of causation, which tended to usurp the function of the jury. 2 LEE E.
KRIENDLER, AVIATION ACCIDENT LAW § 18.01(2) (1991).
43 Lobel, 192 F.2d at 220.
4 See supra note 4 and accompanying text. The prohibition of using Board re-
ports is the same under both sections.
4- 317 F.2d 628 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 895 (1963).
timony was not statutorily prohibited, noting that the
fundamental policy of § 1441(e) seemed to be
a compromise between the interests of those who would
adopt a policy of absolute privilege in order to secure full
and frank disclosure as to the probable cause and thus
help prevent future accidents and the countervailing pol-
icy of making available all accident information to litigants
in a civil suit.46
Since § 1441(e) would exclude reports that expressed
Board opinions of probable cause, the court held it would
also exclude testimony expressing the Board's opinion of
probable cause.47 Because the testimony in this case did
not reflect the Board's findings of probable cause in any
way, the testimony was not prohibited by § 1441(e).48
The court, however, ultimately found the testimony inad-
missible on hearsay grounds.49
Although the admission of the actual report was not at
issue, the Berguido analysis of § 1441 (e) implied that a re-
port could be admitted so long as it complied with the
rules of evidence and did not contain Board findings of
probable cause. Later cases cite Berguido as support for
admission of Board reports, without distinguishing be-
tween testimony and reports. 50
D. AMERICAN AIRLINES V. UNITED STATES
By 1969, the prevailing interpretation of § 1441(e)
seemed to be that Board reports would be barred as evi-
dence.5 1 In American Airlines v. United States 5 2 the Fifth Cir-
46 Id. at 631-32. There is little evidence that Congress intended a balancing of
competing interests, except that it allowed the testimony of investigators through
deposition. See Atwood, supra note 20, at 480-81.
47 Berguido, 317 F.2d at 632.
48 Id.
49 Id. The changes in the Federal Rules of Evidence would alter this aspect of
the opinion today. See Atwood, supra note 20, at 489-91.
- See, e.g., Fidelity & Casualty Co. v. Frank, 227 F. Supp. 948, 949 (D. Conn.
1964); Wenninger v. U.S., 234 F. Supp. 499, 519 (D. Del. 1964), aff'd, 352 F.2d
523 (3d Cir. 1965).
1' Welch & Faulk, supra note 41, at 590. Excluding the report was considered
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cuit took exception to this interpretation and declined to
follow other circuits.
The American suit was an appeal from a jury verdict
awarding damages for the crash of an American Boeing
727. American Airlines contended that the district court
erred by allowing into evidence exhibits from part of the
Board's report. The exhibits consisted of a graph show-
ing the altitude of the 727 and an explanation of the flight
recorder read-out, which American contended showed
the opinions of the investigators that prepared the report.
The Fifth Circuit noted that the exhibits were properly
admitted without objection because they did not reflect
the Board's finding of probable cause.53 By relying on
Berguido, the court stated that the "qualified testimony go-
ing beyond merely personal observations is admissible
provided such testimony does not presume to be official
agency opinion. ' 54 The American opinion did not set forth
any basis for applying the rule used for testimony to the
Board's report under § 1441(e). Further, the American
court did not draw a distinction between admitting inves-
tigator testimony and admitting Board reports. The court
stated that the evidence would be excluded "only when it
embraces the probable cause of the accident or the negli-
gence of the defendant." 5 Thus, the Fifth Circuit ex-
tended the Berguido test concerning deposition testimony
to include parts of a Board report, without a rational basis
for the extension.
E. FALK V. UNITED STATES
Three years later, Falk v. United States56 decided the is-
sue of whether the plaintiff could compel the Board's
chief investigator to give his opinion of the probable
the "only practical way to give adequate effect to and to fulfill the purpose" of
§ 144 1(e). Id. (quoting Fidelity, 227 F. Supp. at 949).
52 418 F.2d 180 (5th Cir. 1969).
5- Id. at 196.
54 Id.
55 Id.
56 53 F.R.D. 113 (D. Conn. 1971).
cause of the accident at deposition. In holding that the
plaintiff could compel the opinion at deposition, the court
drew support from 49 U.S.C. § 1654(e), which requires
the Board to make its opinions available to the public.57
The court presumed that § 1654(e), in making the reports
available to the public, also made the opinions available to
litigants.58 However, the court stated that the defendant
could object and obtain a ruling on admissibility if the
plaintiff attempted to admit the testimony at trial.59
F. KLINE V. MARTIN
In 1972, the District Court for the Eastern District of
Virginia addressed a situation similar to Falk in Kline v.
Martin.61 In Kline, the plaintiffs moved for an order com-
pelling Board investigators to answer deposition ques-
tions about the investigators' opinions. The Kline court
applied the American Airlines rule, which prohibited testi-
mony regarding the probable cause of the crash. 6' This
rule seemed consistent with the purpose of § 1441(e),
namely to prevent the introduction into evidence of
Board reports expressing matters that tend to usurp the
function of the jury.62
The court further noted that the only proscription of
§ 1441(e) was against the use of the Board's report. The
statute did not go so far as to prohibit testimony of the
investigator's opinion, at most it could only proscribe tes-
timony of the investigator's opinion of the probable cause
of the accident.63 The court balanced the reasons for ex-
cluding opinion testimony with the need to make informa-
tion available to litigants, finding that "the interest of
discovering the truth and insuring a just result in civil liti-
57 Id. at 114-15.
58 Welch & Faulk, supra note 41, at 591 (citing Berguido v. Eastern Air Lines,
317 F.2d 628, 632 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 895 (1963)).
59 Falk, 53 F.R.D. at 115.
60 345 F. Supp. 31 (E.D. Va. 1972).
61 Id. at 32.
62 Id. (referring to 49 U.S.C. app. § 1441(e) (1988)).
63 Id. at 32.
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gation" was paramount.64 The court concluded that the
witnesses should be allowed to give opinions so long as
the opinions were not of the ultimate cause of the
accident.65
After Kline, opinion testimony by the Board's investiga-
tors was not precluded under § 1441(e) unless the opin-
ions were about the probable cause of the accident. The
American Airlines rule of the Fifth Circuit was gaining ac-
ceptance and the liberal interpretation of § 1441(e)
continued.
III. RECENT CASE LAW ON NTSB REPORT
ADMISSIBILITY
On July 17, 1975, the rules pertaining to civil accident
investigation were altered to modify the scope of permis-
sible testimony by investigators.66 The notification of the
new rule in the Federal Register stated:
The only opinions of investigators proscribed now are
those which reflect the ultimate determination of cause or
probable cause determined by the Board and expressed in
the Board's reports. The Board considers its revised pol-
icy to be consistent with the existing law, relying in partic-
ular on Kline v. Martin . . . . The Board continues its
prohibition against the requirement that investigators
should testify on matters beyond the scope of their
investigation.
After the change in Board regulations, courts had to re-
consider their positions in light of the new rules.
A. KEEN V. DETROIT DIESEL ALLISON
In 1978, the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
adopted the American Airlines and Kline rationale in Keen v.
C Id.
65 Id. at 33.
- 49 C.F.R. §§ 800-850.35 (1991). For a discussion of NTSB regulations, see
Miller, supra note 7, at 254-66.
67 40 Fed. Reg. 30,231, 30,232 (1975).
1993] CASENOTE 899
Detroit Diesel Allison.68 In Keen, the plaintiff claimed the dis-
trict court erred by admitting a Board investigator's testi-
mony regarding the probable cause of the crash. The
testimony at issue included the investigator's conclusion
that the aircraft was functioning normally at high power
when it crashed.
The plaintiff contended that the testimony was inadmis-
sible under both § 1441(e) and under 49 C.F.R.
§ 835.3(b),69 since it was a matter beyond the scope of the
witness' investigation. The Tenth Circuit did not address
the changes in Board regulations but based its opinion
solely on the interpretation of § 1441(e) in American Air-
lines and Kline.70 The court held that the investigator did
not testify as to the proximate cause of the crash; there-
fore, the trial court did not err in admitting the testi-
mony.7 ' Thus, the change in Board regulations had
virtually no effect on the court's ruling.
6 569 F.2d 547 (10th Cir. 1978).
69 Section 835.3 reads:
(a) Section 701(e) of the [1958] Act .. . preclude[s] the use or ad-
mission into evidence of [NTSB] accident reports in any suit or ac-
tion for damages arising from accidents .... The purposes of these
sections would be defeated if expert opinion testimony of [NTSB]
employees, which may be reflected in the views of the [NTSB] ex-
pressed in its reports, were admitted in evidence or used in litigation
arising out of an accident. The [NTSB] relies heavily upon its inves-
tigators' opinions in its deliberations. Furthermore, the use of
[NTSB] employees as experts to give opinion testimony would im-
pose a significant administrative burden on the [NTSB's] investiga-
tive staff. Litigants must obtain their expert witnesses from other
sources.
(b) For the reasons stated in paragraph (a) of this section and sec-
tion 835.1, [NTSB] employees may only testify as to the factual in-
formation they obtained during the course of an investigation,
including factual evaluations embodied in their factual accident re-
ports. However, they shall decline to testify regarding matters be-
yond the scope of their investigation, and they shall not give any
expert or opinion testimony.
49 C.F.R. § 835.3 (1991).
70 Keen, 569 F.2d at 551.
71 Id.
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B. BENNA V. REEDER FLYING SERVICE
In Benna v. Reeder Flying Service72 the Ninth Circuit
turned its attention from investigator testimony to the ac-
tual Board report, which is expressly inadmissible under
§ 1441(e).73 The issue in Benna was whether it was error
for the jury to view an accident report prepared by a
Board investigator, which had been advertently left on the
judge's bench and read by the jury.
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the jury's
viewing of the report was harmless error.7 4 Of impor-
tance was the fact that the report did not contain a finding
of probable cause, but was merely cumulative of other evi-
dence presented by testimony and cross-examination dur-
ing the trial.75 Had the jury seen a finding of probable
cause, the court stated it would have had "no trouble
granting a new trial since this report would have definitely
prejudiced the jury by unfairly placing a government
stamp of officiality on the probable cause of the accident"
and accordingly the report would tend to usurp the func-
tion of the jury.76
The Ninth Circuit did not appear to view the statutory
prohibition of § 1441(e) as requiring a new trial in Benna,
so long as the purpose of the prohibition was intact.
Since the jury did not view the Board's determination of
probable cause (the purpose of § 1441 (e) according to the
American Airlines and Kline rules), the error was harmless.
The stage was set for the battle over admission of the re-
port into evidence in direct contravention of § 144 1(e).
72 578 F.2d 269 (9th Cir. 1978).
Is 49 U.S.C. app. § 1441(e) (1988).
74 Benna, 578 F.2d at 271-72.
75 Id. at 272.
76 Id.
C. IN RE AIR CRASH DISASTER AT STAPLETON
INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT, DENVER, COLORADO, ON
NOVEMBER 15, 198777
The Stapleton case was a multidistrict action involving
claims resulting from the crash of a Continental Airlines
DC-9.78 Plaintiffs offered the Board's report as evidence
in support of their claims, voluntarily excluding the por-
tions of the report captioned "Executive Summary,"
"Probable Cause Finding," and "Recommendations."
Defendants objected to admission of the entire report
urging the court to apply the Ninth Circuit rule that
§ 1441(e) acts as a complete bar to the admission of any
part of the report. Defendants specifically objected to the
admission of an appendix to the report termed "Human
Factors report," which implied the co-pilot and crew
lacked qualifications needed to fly the DC-9 in weather
conditions existing at the time of the crash. The defend-
ants cited Protectus Alpha Navigation Co. v. North Pacific Grain
Growers 79 for the Ninth Circuit rule. The Protectus court
held that the district court did not err in relying on the
strict application of § 1441(e) to exclude the Board's re-
port.80 The Protectus court mentioned that the strict appli-
cation of § 1441(e) had been modified to permit some
reports into evidence so long as they did not express the
probable cause of the crash, citing American Airlines, Keen,
and Berguido as examples.8 ' The Protectus court failed to
note, however, that only American Airlines allowed part of
the Board's report into evidence,82 while Keen 83 and
Berguido84 involved only investigator testimony.
Plaintiffs urged the court to adopt the Tenth Circuit
rule in Keen. The Stapleton court stated that the Tenth Cir-
17 720 F. Supp. 1493 (D. Colo. 1989).
71 Id. at 1494.
79 767 F.2d 1379 (9th Cir. 1985).
80 Id. at 1385.
81 Id.
82 See supra notes 52-55 and accompanying text.
81 See supra notes 68-71 and accompanying text.
"I See supra notes 44-50 and accompanying text.
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cuit interpretation of the purpose of § 1441(e) was "to
bar admission of conclusions or opinions more properly
left to a jury rather than to establish a privilege encourag-
ing full disclosure to the investigating agency."' 85 How-
ever, the Stapleton court did not consider the fact that the
Keen interpretation applied only to the admission of testi-
mony into evidence, not to the admission of parts of theBoard's report.8 6 The Stapleton court completely failed to
consider the express language of § 1441 (e) which states in
part: "No part of any report ... shall be admitted as evi-
dence .... ,, The Stapleton court adopted the Keen inter-
pretation, denying the defendants' motion to exclude the
entire Board report."" The court further stated that ad-
mitting the report would not usurp the function of the
jury, so long as "conclusions regarding the probable
cause of an accident presented by the Board" were
excluded.89
Next, the court addressed whether a part of the Board
report entitled "Human Factors report" should be ex-
cluded on hearsay grounds. 90 The Stapleton court ex-
amined the Human Factors report in light of the Supreme
Court's interpretation of the public records exception to
the hearsay rule9' in Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey.92 In
Rainey, the Supreme Court determined that portions of
government reports are not inadmissible under Rule
85 Stapleton, 720 F. Supp. at 1496 (citing Keen, 569 F.2d at 549).
86 See supra notes 68-71 and accompanying text.
87 49 U.S.C. app. § 1441(e) (1988). See supra text accompanying note 22.
88 Stapleton, 720 F. Supp. at 1496.
89 Id.
9 Id. at 1497.
91 FED. R. EVID. 803(8). This rule states an exception to the hearsay rule for:
Records, reports, statements, or data compilations, in any form, of
public offices or agencies, setting forth . . . (c) in civil actions and
proceedings and against the Government in criminal cases, factual
findings resulting from an investigation made pursuant to authority
granted by law, unless the sources of information or other circum-
stances indicate lack of trustworthiness.
Id.
92 488 U.S. 153 (1988). For a discussion of the effect of Rule 803(8), see
Atwood, supra note 20, at 489-91.
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803 (8) (c) of the Federal Rules of Evidence merely because
they contain conclusions or opinions. 93 The Stapleton
court stated that under the Rainey decision some conclu-
sions or opinions in Board reports may be admissible
when they are: "(1) based on a factual investigation; and
(2) trustworthy under the Rules of Evidence." 94 After ap-
plying a four-pronged test to determine the trustworthi-
ness,9 5 the Stapleton Court admitted some parts of the
Human Factors report.96 The court edited out all recom-
mendations based on the Board's probable cause determi-
nation, double-hearsay statements not falling within a
hearsay exception, and triple-hearsay statements.9 7
The Stapleton court ignored the express congressional
mandate of § 1441 (e) 98 by allowing parts of the NTSB re-
port into evidence. Even though § 1441(e) has been in-
terpreted to allow investigator deposition testimony, its
clear language forbids admitting any part of the Board's
report into evidence. 99 The District Court for the North-
ern District of Illinois took exception to the Stapleton deci-
sion, recognizing the distinction between investigator
testimony and Board reports in its recent ruling on In re
Air Crash Disaster at Sioux City, Iowa. 00
IV. IN RE AIR CRASH DISASTER AT SIOUX CITY
A. SIOUX CITY INTERPRETATION OF SECTION 1441(e)
Whether the NTSB report was admissible evidence at
trial was an issue of first impression for the Northern Dis-
trict of Illinois in Sioux City.' 0 The Sioux City court
95 Rainey, 488 U.S. at 170.
94 Stapleton, 720 F. Supp. at 1497 (citing Rainey, 488 U.S. at 169 n.12, 170).
95 The four factors are: "(1) timeliness of the investigation, (2) special skill or
experience of the investigator, (3) whether a hearing was held and the level at
which it was conducted, and (4) any possible motivation or bias problems in the
preparation of the report." Id. at 1498.
9 Id. at 1499.
97 Id.
98 49 U.S.C. app. § 1441(e) (1988).
9 Id.
-0 780 F. Supp. 1207 (N.D. II1. 1991).
101 See supra notes 1-4 and accompanying text.
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granted defendants' motion to exclude the entire Board
report, 1 2 exposed the defects in the Stapleton court's ra-
tionale, and adopted the Ninth Circuit's interpretation of
§ 1441(e) as set forth in Protectus and Benna. I0 3
In excluding the report, the Sioux City court concluded
that the clear language of § 1441 (e) left no room for crea-
tive interpretation. 0 4 "The language, on its face, states
an absolute bar to the use of NTSB reports in the present
action."' 1 5 The court dismissed the interpretation of
§ 1441(e) advanced by plaintiffs, that the report was ad-
missible so long as Board opinions of probable cause
were excluded, as "facially improbable.' 0 6 In adopting
the strict interpretation of the statute, the court based its
rationale on the flaws in the Stapleton court's application of
Keen. 10 7
B. FLAws IN THE STAPLETON APPLICATION OF KEEN
The Stapleton court failed to draw the distinction be-
tween the admissibility of investigator testimony and the
admissibility of the report itself. 108 The regulations
promulgated by the Board delineate a clear distinction be-
tween investigator testimony and evidentiary use of re-
ports. Current regulations expressly prohibit the use of
any part of the Board's report as evidence, 0 9 limit investi-
gator testimony to deposition form, 110 and limit the inves-
tigator's use of the report only to "refresh his memory" at
deposition."1 Courts should at least address the lines
102 Sioux City, 780 F. Supp. at 1212.
10o See supra notes 72-76, 79-84, and accompanying text.
1 4 Sioux City, 780 F. Supp. at 1208.
105 Id. at 1208-09.
o6 Id. at 1209.
107 Id. For the Stapleton court's application of Keen, see supra notes 89-93 and
accompanying text.
o0 Sioux City, 780 F. Supp. at 1209.
109 Id. at 1209 (citing 55 Fed. Reg. 41,541 (1990) (codified at 49 C.F.R. § 835.2
(1991)).
1o Id.
I Id. (citing 55 Fed. Reg. 41,541 (1990) (codified at 49 C.F.R. § 835.4 (1991)).
Section 835.4 reads:
(a) [An NTSB] employee may use a copy of his factual accident re-
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drawn by the regulations when interpreting § 1441(e).
The Sioux City court noted that the purpose of § 1441(e)
was "to preserve the functions of court and jury uninflu-
enced by the findings of the Board or investigators." '"12
Even though this purpose will not necessarily be frus-
trated by allowing parts of the report into evidence, the
statutory language shows Congress intended to bar the
Board's report entirely." 13
The Sioux City court found an additional basis for re-
jecting the Stapleton rationale in Thomas Brooks Chartered v.
Burnett, 114 a recent Tenth Circuit case. In Thomas Brooks
the Tenth Circuit refused to permit the representative of
an individual killed in a plane crash to observe the Board's
investigation.115 In doing so, the Tenth Circuit character-
ized Keen as applying only to investigator testimony. 1" 6
This interpretation was a significant indication that the
Tenth Circuit would not follow the Stapleton rationale. 1 7
The Sioux City court additionally noted that if the Staple-
ton rationale was adopted, permitting the admission of
Board reports, the congressional purpose of § 1441(e)
could be compromised by the operation of the Federal
Rules of Evidence." 8 For example, any part of a Board's
report admitted into evidence would be governed by Fed-
eral Rule of Evidence 803(8), which creates an exception
to the hearsay rule for certain factual findings of investiga-
tions by a public agency." 9 The Supreme Court has
broadly construed factual findings under Rule 803(8) to
port as a testimonial aid, and may refer to that report during his
testimony or use it to refresh his memory.
(b) Consistent with section 701 (e) of the [1958] Act ... a[n NTSB]
employee may not use the [NTSB's] accident report for any purpose
during his testimony.
49 C.F.R. § 835.4 (1991).
12 Sioux City, 780 F. Supp. at 1210 (citing Universal, 188 F.2d at 1000).
i's Id.
114 920 F.2d 634 (10th Cir. 1990).
115 Id. at 647.
116 See id.
"7 See Sioux City, 780 F. Supp. at 1211 n.40.
18 Id. at 1211-12.
119 Id.
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include certain types of conclusions reasonably inferred
from the evidence. 20 Accordingly, Board opinions that
rarely stop short of stating the probable cause of the crash
could be admitted under this construction of Rule 803(8).
Board opinions, admitted through the operation of Rule
803(8) would be allowed to influence the jury's determi-
nation of probable cause in direct contravention to the
stated purpose of § 1441(e).
C. RULING
Based upon a strict interpretation of § 1441(e), the
Sioux City court granted defendants' motion in limine, rul-
ing that the Board's report was inadmissible at trial.' 2'
The court rejected the Stapleton rationale, since admission
of the report would ignore the clear prohibition of the
statute and thereby subvert its purpose.
V. CONCLUSION
A. ADMISSIBILITY OF INVESTIGATOR TESTIMONY
The case law regarding the testimony of Board investi-
gators seems well settled. The American Airlines rule 22
that "it would be better to exclude opinion testimony only
when it embraces the probable cause of the accident or
the negligence of the defendant"' 23 is widely followed.
The Kline 124 and Keen 2 5 decisions adopted the Fifth Cir-
cuit American Airlines rule and established that § 1441(e)
does not prohibit opinion testimony of the investigators
unless the opinions are about the probable cause of the
accident.
Courts following the American Airlines rule interpret
§ 1441(e) to allow some opinion testimony and generally
120 See Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey, 488 U.S. 153, 170 (1988); see supra notes
96-104 and accompanying text.
12, 780 F. Supp. at 1213.
122 See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
123 American Airlines v. United States, 418 F.2d 180, 196 (5th Cir. 1969).
4 See supra notes 64-69 and accompanying text.
2T5 See supra notes 72-75 and accompanying text.
construe the purpose of the statute as to prevent the ad-
mission of evidence that tends to usurp the function of the
jury. Since opinion testimony cannot be admitted about
the Board's determination of the ultimate cause of the ac-
cident, the testimony does not "place a government
stamp of officiality on the probable cause of the acci-
dent" 1 26 and does not contravene the purpose of the
statute.
B. ADMISSIBILITY OF NTSB REPORTS
The admissibility of Board reports into evidence is not
as well-settled. The Stapleton decision allows the reports
into evidence so long as the part of the report admitted
does not contain Board findings of probable cause and
otherwise comports with the Federal Rules of Evidence. 127
This interpretation of § 1441(e) completely ignores the
plain language of the statute and instead relies on the pur-
pose behind the statute.
The better-reasoned approach is set forth in In re Crash
at Sioux City.' 28 The Sioux City approach is based on the
clear language of the statutory ban of Board reports into
evidence. The Sioux City opinion points to the flaws of the
Stapleton rationale by showing that admitting the reports
conceivably usurps the function of the jury through the
operation of the Federal Rules of Evidence. Had Con-
gress intended portions of such reports to be allowed into
evidence, surely they would not have made the explicit
statutory ban.
C. CONCLUSION
Commentators have called for congressional action in
interpreting § 1441(e) for some time. If courts follow the
Sioux City rationale, however, that would not be necessary.
NTSB investigators would be allowed to testify about fac-
126 Benna v. Reeder Flying Service, 578 F.2d 269, 272 (9th Cir. 1978).
127 See supra notes 81-104 and accompanying text.
128 See supra notes 105-25 and accompanying text.
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tual information and opinions (but not probable cause
opinions) surrounding the accident. This is desirable
since it supports one goal of the judicial system: to allow
litigants access to information necessary to their case.
Precluding NTSB investigators from giving their opin-
ion of the probable cause of the accident is also desirable,
because it keeps the investigator from directly influencing
civil liabilities. The litigants are free to hire their own ex-
perts to examine the NTSB reports and make a probable
cause determination, and their adversary may cross-ex-
amine the expert without appearing to attack the NTSB
findings. 129
The role of the NTSB in civil litigation changed with
each court interpretation of § 1441(e). Before the recent
Sioux City opinion, one commentator proposed that, "[a]s
more courts ignore the current prohibition on the use of
NTSB findings, plaintiff's attorneys will begin to forum
shop as inequities develop between jurisdictions. The
time has come, once again, for the Legislature to
speak."' 30 It would be nice if Congress took action when-
ever jurisdictions elaborated differing rules. But until
Congress does so, courts should adopt the better rule of
admissibility of NTSB reports: the Sioux City rule.
Leigh Ann White
129 See Atwood, supra note 20, at 502.
1SO I. at 504.
